Blackstone's mistake had been to adopt a nonsensical moral theory, the natural law, which, through its doctrine that lex iniusta non est lex (an unjust law is no law), led to the ultraconservative view that if something was a law, then it must be just. Second, following David Hume, 5 Bentham criticized Blackstone's support for the theory of the social contract on the grounds that it failed to provide both an adequate explanation of the actual foundation of government, and any adequate justification for it. In Bentham's view, 'natural society' and 'political society' co-existed in varying degrees in all societies, and hence it made no sense to posit the notion of a natural society being transformed into a political society by means of a social contract. Even if there had been some form of contract in the past, it could not bind persons who had not agreed to it, and, moreover, like any promise, it could never have any moral authority in and of itself, but only by reference to some external standard. Third,
Bentham criticized Blackstone's theory of sovereignty, which claimed that in every state there must exist 'a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside'. 6 Bentham pointed out that there were examples of states where sovereign power was limited, otherwise it would be as much as to say that there was 'no such thing as government' in the German Empire, the Dutch Provinces, or the Swiss Cantons. 7 In A Fragment on Government, Bentham did not restrict himself to mere criticism. 8 He outlined a number of themes which he would go on to develop in later writings: the habit of obedience as the foundation of law-making power; a 'natural arrangement' of offences (that is one based on the harm caused by the act in question), instead of the 'technical arrangement' (that is one without any principled basis) that characterized the Common Law and Blackstone's account of it, as the appropriate structure for a legal system; the principle of utility as the standard by which to ascertain the point at which resistance to government became justified; and paraphrasis (the relating of abstract terms to entities in the real, physical world) as the correct method for the exposition of fundamental legal terms.
As Parliament into a significant measure of codification. 16 More generally, the work belonged to his attempt to undermine the whole political, legal, and ecclesiastical establishment of the United Kingdom, and replace it with a representative democracy or, in his terminology, a republic. He distinguished between the oppressing 'ruling few, whom he identified with the non-productive classes, consisting of the monarcho-aristocratic establishment on the one hand, and the oppressed 'subject many', the productive classes consisting of the unenfranchised mass of the people on the other hand. 17 It was to the latter group that 'Blackstone familiarized' was addressed.
II. Why (still) Blackstone?
In the 1770s in 'Preparatory Principles', Bentham explained that he 'attacked' Blackstone's Commentaries, and not works by other authors, in the first place because of its 'giving Law to 15 Schofield, Utility and Democracy, 109-36. In 1809 Bentham began to write on parliamentary reform, and from 1822 to work on a 'Constitutional Code', his own blueprint for a democratic constitution: ibid., 137-40, 244-9. 16 Ibid., 319-20. 17 J Bentham, First Principles preparatory to Constitutional Code, P Schofield (ed) , (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989), 136-7, 155-67. men's opinions'-in other words, because the degree and extent of its influence was greater than that of any other work-and in the second place because of its lack of 'sincerity and openness'. He explained that, 'The opinion which it seems to be the constant and almost universal scope of the work to inculcate is that that ought ever to be, which is.' The Jurisprudence to speak the language of the Scholar and the Gentleman', had 'decked her out … from the toilette of classic erudition', and 'enlivened her with metaphors and allusions'.
He continued:
The merit to which, as much perhaps as to any, the work stands indebted for its reputation, is the enchanting harmony of its numbers: a kind of merit that of itself is sufficient to give a certain degree of celebrity to a work devoid of every other. So much is man governed by his ear. Bentham not only referred to Blackstone's Commentaries as the most popular and attractive work on the subject, but also to its justificatory role in showing that 'every thing is as it should be'. In order to counter the complacency induced by the Commentaries,
Bentham's intention was to expose those matters on which Blackstone, together with the lawyers who followed and admired him, pretended that the law was different from what it
really was and what it ought to be, so that readers would avoid 'the snares into which they are thus in danger of falling', and thereby reduce 'to its smallest dimensions the quantity of the suffering, to which, by Law as it is, they are, at every step they take, in this thorny and cloudy region, so unhappily exposed'. 28 If his purpose was to give an account of English law,
Bentham asked himself, then why not simply give an abridgment of the Commentaries? The answer was that Blackstone's work, despite all the efforts that had been made to render it comprehensible to non-lawyers, and despite its four large volumes, remained 'in but a very imperfect degree intelligible'. Hence, it was unlikely that any abridgment, in the form of the three 'small numbers' into which Bentham's work would be compressed, would be any less unintelligible than the Commentaries. The solution was to give an account of law as it ought to be, thereby giving 'some conception … of law as it is taken in large masses'. 29 Bentham explained that it would be 'through the instrumentality of Universal Jurisprudence' that the reader would see what the law ought to be, and thereby have a standard of reference with which to compare law as it is, and to see how the latter could be brought closer to the 26 UC xxxi. 93 (9 August 1828). 27 UC xxxi. 75 (23 July 1828). On the relationship of law as it is, law as it ought to be, and law as it pretends to be see part III below. 28 former, 30 the desideratum that Bentham had announced in A Fragment on Government. 31 The point was to demonstrate to the subject many that the laws of England were an instrument of oppression in the hands of the ruling few.
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III. A Dream
In the hope of rendering 'Blackstone familiarized' as appealing as possible to its intended readership, the subject many, the general mass of the people, Bentham had the idea of presenting it in the form of a theatrical performance that had appeared to him in a dream. One therefore, apply to particular ordinances or enactments, since they were different in different nations, but to 'certain of the ideas' that law 'is composed of'. Different languages had, of course, adopted different words to signify these ideas, but to the extent that the same ideas were being expressed, it could be claimed that, 'of the language of law, there is a portion which is common to all nations'. 39 The new element introduced in 1828, or rather by 1828, 40 was law as it pretends to be. The emergence of this notion, personified in Dolosa, was, as noted above, perhaps related to the emergence of Bentham's political radicalism in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Bentham had come to recognize that the state of the law was not the product of complacency and deference to the authority of the past, but due to rulers, and in particular lawyers in the form of 'Judge & Co.', having a sinister interest in maintaining and promoting abuses. 41 The problem did not lie, as Bentham had thought, in a failure of the understanding, but in the corruption of the will. 42 The legal establishment feared that merely to describe law as it is might result in the exposure of its shortcomings, and so needed to present it as a system of perfection in order to continue to delude the subject many. 43 Bentham aimed to present Blackstone as the stooge, the willing collaborator, of the ruling few in this exercise of deception. resumed: 'My Judges give remedies for whatever wrongs they and I please to give: and they deny remedies for whatever wrongs they and I please they should be denied.' In general, Gubernia explained, they gave no remedy for breach of trust, and there was no restitution of a thing unlawfully taken, but instead they gave a sum of money which might be to any amount below the value of the thing taken. 47 Dolosa pointed out that the equity judges gave a remedy in both cases: 'Ask Blackstone else.' The conversation proceeded as follows:
ASTRAEA. Yes, a remedy which is worse than the disease. If, by the wrong, you have lost to the amount £10 paid, they first make you lose £100, and then, for a great number of Years, they have great doubts what to do about the matter, and when you are ruined or dead of a broken heart, they give you either nothing or something which goes to pay your lawyer. GUBERNIA. In some cases, the wrongdoer puts me in such a passion that I do not know what I am about: I then kill the man: and if he has any money I can get at, I put it into my own pocket. Sister Felicia would, I warrant her, give it to the party wronged: in case of a murder, to the widow and children of the party murdered. That is because she is such a simpleton. 45 This is to add a nuance to the view expressed in ibid., 312, that Bentham's attack was not restricted to Blackstone, but was directed against the whole system of thought that underpinned the Common Law, and aimed to shift the paradigm of law away from customary rules and practices to statute law and codification. 46 BLACKSTONE. Madam, I stand corrected: the press shall be corrected accordingly.
FELICIA. Would the public be the less satisfied, if the individual wronged were satisfied too? 48 Bentham was drawing attention to the gloss that Blackstone had put on the Common Law, and suggesting that he had understood perfectly well the way in which the law in fact operated, but had been so naively convinced of its excellence, and so oblivious to its inherent injustice, that he had been prepared to describe it without a second thought as to whether he might inadvertently be exposing the whole sham. At this point, the knowing and corrupt ruler in the person of Dolosa had to intervene, and prod Blackstone into changing his terminology in such a way that it appeared that the community as a whole, rather than the legal and political establishment alone, benefited from the 'satisfaction' extracted from the wrongdoer.
IV. The Greatest Happiness Principle
In another dialogue, Bentham took the opportunity to explain the proper end or purpose of a legal system, and hence to draw a contrast with the actual, corrupt end or purpose of the English legal system. 49 Astraea asked Felicia to 'inform our disciples what in this country law ought to be'. Felicia explained that, 'Law as it ought to be has for its end the greatest happiness of the greatest number: that is to say of the members of the community in question'. 50 Astraea pointed out that Felicia had made 'an error in expression', and that, instead of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', she should have said 'the greatest happiness of the whole community'. The point was that the greatest happiness of the greatest 48 number did not equate with 'the greatest happiness of the whole number together', in that the happiness of a majority might be promoted at the expense of that of a minority, and overall happiness be diminished. Suppose, said Bentham, a community of 2,001 persons, where 1,001 were masters and 1,000 slaves:
the community of which the masters are members made as happy as it is in the power of the best laws to make them: but the slaves as ill-treated and thence as unhappy as it is possible for them to be, consistently with their remaining slaves. Is it credible that, in this state of things, the quantity of happiness in the 2,001 taken together would be as great as if, still under the best system of laws possible, all were free, none slaves, none masters of slaves?
51
At some point, possibly in the mid-1820s, 52 Bentham had come to recognize that he had to make it clear that the promotion of the greatest happiness did not simply involve counting the number of individuals who benefited or suffered from a certain law, measure, policy, or action, but the degree to which each such individual benefited or suffered.
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In response to Astraea's exposition of the greatest happiness principle, Dolosa stated:
'Madam, it is all theory: it is a dangerous doctrine: it is innovation: manifest innovation.'
Gubernia then said that she and Dolosa were not concerned with the happiness of the community: 'The Law of England has for its all-comprehensive end the giving on all occasions execution and effect to the pleasure of its Sovereign Lord the King. According to Dolosa, the distinction between law as it ought to be and what the law was in England was 'no better than a fanciful one: mere theory, nothing better: neither Grotius nor Puffendorf 57 knew of any such distinction'. Given that the English law was 'the perfection of reason', any arrangement which ought to be established was necessarily established.
Conversely, once it was established, it was 'exactly that which ought to be established'.
The law ought to [be] so and so: therefore, so it is: the law is so and so: therefore, so it ought to be. Such is our logic. This being admitted, it follows that, when applied to the law of England, the is and the ought to be are interconvertible terms.
This was more particularly true of the Common Law, which was wholly the product of the judges. As for statute law, the judges 'take it in hand and mould it into proper form, as if it were so much common law', just as Mansfield had declared that it was his practice 'to mould the law'. 'Equity is but an improved modification of the Common Law: Lord Eldon, when he 
V. The Structure of a Legal System
In the mid-1770s in 'Preparatory Principles', Bentham pointed out that it was necessary to explain the nature of private rights before public rights could be understood. Laws which concerned public interests, establishing public powers, duties, and restraints, were 'not intelligible' but by reference to those regulating private interests, establishing private powers, duties, and restraints. Hence, in order to describe clearly a legal system, it was necessary to deal first with the private before dealing with the public. 'Many writers', Bentham claimed, had begun with the latter, 'and in proceeding thus they are obliged to take up with the gross conceptions that men have of them from habit without instruction'. A man best understood the interest he had in what he called his own, and it was through comparing his interest in his own things with the interests that corporate bodies and public trustees had in the things under their charge that these latter interests could be most clearly explained. The more simple idea of private powers over things was the key to understanding the more complex idea of public powers. 60 In short, in order to provide a clear explanation, it was necessary to begin with that which was simple and could be comprehended by itself, and proceed to that which was more complex.
In 'Blackstone familiarized', Bentham applied this criticism explicitly to Blackstone's organization of English law in the Commentaries, which began with the rights of government Bentham's view) , at Commentaries, i. 70-1, that the Act of Union of 1707 presented 'an insurmountable bar' to the reform of the Church of England, which Bentham categorized as an example of 'the posterity-chainer's device ' (254-6, 444-6) . 60 Bentham, Preparatory Principles, officials instead of the rights of private individuals. Bentham now offered two reasons for dealing with private rights before public: one was the logical point that he had put forward in the 1770s, namely that the more simple should be explained before the more complex, and it was, therefore, impossible to understand the nature of public rights and duties before the nature of private rights and duties had been explained; the other was a political point, not advanced in the 1770s, that to follow the reverse order was to insinuate that the rights of rulers were more important than those of subjects. Astraea combined both points when announcing the rule dealing with the order of explanation: 'The course meant to be pursued on this occasion is this: those things which are at the same time most extensively interesting and most easily intelligible first.' She went on to explain that law was not only necessary to the well-being, but to the existence, of human beings in a social state, and that in order to achieve this purpose, it created rights and their correspondent obligations. The rights of which a person had the most immediate need to be aware were those from which he received the most obvious benefit, and the obligations those by the non-fulfilment of which he was in most danger of being subjected to punishment. Of less importance to the individual, and less immediately intelligible, were the rights and obligations that made up the machinery of government, and which in turn, apart from protecting the community against foreign enemies, were only valuable insofar as they created and secured the rights of individuals. 61 At this point, Gubernia complained that 'this is not the order pursued by Doctor Blackstone'. Astraea retorted that Blackstone's object was 'to recommend his work to the favour of the constituted authorities', whereas her object was 'to instruct, and by the instruction serve and benefit, those for whose sake they have been or ought to have been so constituted'. For the politically radical Bentham, the two elements of the choice of arrangement and the corrupt purpose of the Commentaries were intimately linked: 'Public is to Private what plural is to singular.
[Blackstone] sets about explaining plurals before any explanation given of the singulars of which they are composed. He speaks of the few considered as governors, before speaking of the many considered as governed.' It was far more important to a person to know what rights he himself had rather than those which the King had, especially when he realized that the latter could only be understood once the former had been explained.
The right which an individual has to the hat he has on his head, is of more immediate and certain importance to him than the right which the King has to his crown. The machinery by which the individual's right is created and conferred is more simple than that by which the King's right is created and conferred: the operation, when explained, will be found more easily intelligible.
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In the arrangement adopted in the Commentaries, Blackstone, as the mouthpiece of rulers, In this arrangement may be seen a semblance of apt method and expression: but the reality … is wanting. By this method of his, clear conceptions not capable of being afforded, hence the necessity of another, by which such conceptions may be afforded, and by reference to which the clouds in which his method is involved may be dispelled. Wrongs', had referred to 'the conception attached by him to the word right', but he had neither given, nor had attempted to give, any such explanation. In Blackstone's interpretation of law as it is, 'at the very first step' there was 'confusion', for he had then referred to the rights of persons and the rights of things, and seemed to think that, because he had used the same preposition of in both cases, that he had conveyed the same idea, 'but in reality no such thing has he done'. The word of denoted 'the idea of possession', and while it made sense to say that persons possessed things, both corporeal and incorporeal, it did not make sense, except figuratively, to speak of a thing possessing something. You possess your coat, but your coat does not possess anything, except properties such as being made of a certain sort of cloth and being of a certain colour, and such qualities were not 'real beings-parcels of matter-as your coat itself is: they are but so many fictitious beings-fictitious entitiesspoken of as if they were really existing-spoken of in this way of necessity for the purposes of discourse'. When applied to persons, the word right, continued Bentham, indicated the possession of the right; when applied to things, it indicated the subject-matter of the right. 64 Bentham advanced a further criticism-that Blackstone had confounded rights with Bentham's first point was that, had Blackstone merely referred to 'bodily contention', his explanation would have been clearer, although further elucidation of these words would be required. The insertion of 'strife' and 'the peace of society', however, produced uncertainty.
The raising of 'doubts upon doubts' was typical of everything that Blackstone said, reflecting 'the property of whatever is said under the name of Common Law to make us believe that we know what, in case of our doing so, would be done to us by the Judge-though that same knowledge is essentially impossible'. The Common Law had no determinate form of words.
While one party in a case might say that such and such were the words of the Common Law, his adversary might deny this and say that some other set of words were the words of the Common Law. Insofar as each party claimed that what the other party said was false, they were speaking the truth; but insofar as each party claimed that their set of words was the 67 Bentham, Comment/Fragment, 415. 68 See UC xxx. 77-8, xxxi. 23-9 (21, 23, 26-8 August 1828) . 69 Blackstone, Commentaries, iii. 3. incoherent account of English law given by Blackstone, resulting from his concern to show that 'every thing is as it should be'. 75 The wider purpose in the essay as a whole was to undermine the legitimacy of the English legal establishment in the eyes of the subject many,
by showing how it worked in the interests of the ruling few, and not, as was often pretended, in the interests of the whole community. 'Blackstone familiarized' was, therefore, just one more contribution to Bentham's campaign to introduce representative democracy into Britain.
VI. Conclusion: New Ideas
In material written in October and November 1814 for a chapter entitled 'J.B.'s new ideas derived from Logic' and intended for his essay on 'Logic', Bentham made a list of fourteen such 'new ideas'. 76 The eighth point in the list was 'Conditions to the accomplishment of any object, in so far as depends upon human means.' Bentham explained that, for any agent to perform any action, including 'the due execution of any public trust', both will and power were necessary. Power was either ab intrà, that is to say proportionate to the degree of knowledge or 'intelligence' and active talent (that is the willingness to perform an appropriate action) possessed by the actor, or ab extrà, that is to say proportionate to 'the extent and degree of compliance on the part of those over whom it is considered as being exercised'. Where a person had a moral duty to perform an act, the person who possessed 'the appropriate will or inclination' thereby possessed 'the virtue of probity'. 77 Hence, the three requisites were probity, intelligence, and active talent, which Bentham had, by 1822, renamed and to some extent recast, as moral aptitude, intellectual aptitude, and active aptitude. The securing of official aptitude became the principal theme of Bentham's later writings on representative democracy, and in particular of his 'Constitutional Code', the major endeavour
